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Daniel Statman*
America perceives itself and is perceived by others as part of the liberal
West. Yet, at least in the area of punishment, argues James Whitman from
the Yale Law School, America no longer belongs in this liberal company.
Because of its "tough-on-crime" ideology and practice in the last twenty-
five years, America has edged its way into the embarrassing company of
countries like Iran, Nigeria, China, and even Nazi Germany. The
comparison with Nazism might sound to the reader as exaggerated, yet,
argues Whitman, one cannot ignore the analogy between the Nazi turn
towards retributivism and the current direction in America. At least with
regard to ordinary criminals (unlike political dissidents, Jews etc.), "there
was a shade more of a drive toward dignity, and even mildness, in
punishment in Nazi Germany, than there is in America today"!'
I start with this provocative claim to give the readers a sense of the
depth of the divide between America and Europe in their attitudes towards
punishment. The difference is expressed not only in the American attitude
towards capital punishment, an issue with which everybody is familiar,
and in the new "shame sanctions," penalties which would be unthinkable
in Europe. Harshness of legal systems can express itself in various forms
and on different levels and, on Whitman's view, America's legal system is
harsher than Europe's in all respects: America criminalizes a wider variety
of conduct than Europe does (especially in the realm of commerce and
sex); it subjects more classes of people to potential criminal liability
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(especially minors); the punishments it imposes are far less flexible and
less individualized; its punishments are far more severe (American
convicts serve sentences roughly five to ten times as long as their French
counterparts); America is far less sensitive than Europe to the dignitary
needs of inmates (e.g. privacy); and finally, the granting of pardons is
much less common in America than in Europe.
To begin the book, Whitman does an excellent job of showing in detail
how deep the differences between America and Europe (more accurately,
France and Germany) are, thus preempting any possible objection that the
differences he is trying to explain are marginal or incidental. In chapters
two and three, he demonstrates a consistent move toward greater
harshness in almost all aspects of the punitive system in America,
compared to a consistent move toward mildness and reform in France and
Germany. This divide between countries all belonging to the West and
sharing more or less the same values is truly amazing, and Whitman's
main undertaking in Harsh Justice is to offer an explanation for it by
exposing its deep historical roots.
The explanation cannot be given in terms of "modernity" alone, a la
Durkheim, Foucault or others, because, while both America and France
went through a process of modernization in more or less the same period
of time, they moved in opposing directions as far as punishment is
concerned. To understand this opposition, argues Whitman, we must refer
to the different histories of America and Europe, in particular to the
different social and political traditions that existed in these two continents
in the eighteenth century.
The first and most central difference mentioned by Whitman has to do
with the distinction between low- and high-status punishment. In France
and Germany, there was a long history of guaranteeing high-status
treatment to some convicts, mainly those convicted on political and
religious grounds, together with the rich and the noble, while imposing
degrading and harsh punishment on all the rest. When egalitarian ideas
started to penetrate society and politics in the wake of modernity, they
pushed towards the idea of the same punishment for all, and this took the
form in Europe of leveling up. The history of punishment in France and
Germany is the history of granting more and more privileges, previously
afforded only to the higher classes, to all convicts and all criminals. Thus,
"the treatment of the tiny minority of high-status prisoners was the germ
from which much of twentieth-century punishment practices [in Europe]
would eventually spring." 2 By contrast, in America, no such distinction
between low- and high-status convicts existed. American prisons mixed
all inmates together regardless of their social status or the nature of their
2. Id. at 125.
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law-violation, and all inmates received the same treatment. The story of
American history is that of the generalization of low-status treatment with
all the harshness and indignity involved. Like in Europe, it is a story of
leveling, but, unlike Europe, it is a story of leveling down.
And if one asks why America had no high-status punishment, the
answer has to do with a fundamental difference in social structure between
America and the continent. The American colonies had no aristocrats, and
Americans cared far less about questions of status than Europeans did.
Hence, America did not come up with any special form of punishment for
aristocrats that could later serve as a basis for mild and respectful
punishment for all. Note how original and surprising this suggestion is.
Intuitively, one would have expected, as Tocqueville indeed did in the
nineteenth century, that societies would become less harsh as conditions
became more equal. Social inequality connotes injustice and a lack of
proper respect for human beings, and all this is connected with the harsher
punishment. But, on Whitman's account, as a matter of fact the opposite
proved to be true: France and Germany, both strongly hierarchical in the
eighteenth century, moved in the direction of mild and dignified
punishment for all, while America, a relatively more egalitarian society,
moved in the direction of harsh and degrading punishment
No less original and unexpected is Whitman's second explanation for
the divide between America and Europe, which has to do with the power
of the state. One might expect that the more powerful the state and the
fewer the restraints on its power, the harsher the punishments it would
impose. Accordingly, one would guess that American resistance to state
power would have led to a reduction of the power in the hands of the
government and administration and, hence, to less severe punitive
measures. But again, argues Whitman, the opposite holds true. It is
precisely because America's power is relatively weak and restrained that
punishment is harsh there, while stronger states, like France and Germany
make for mild punishment.
Why so? Firstly, Whitman argues, because of the intimate connection
between sovereignty, especially monarchical sovereignty, and the notions
of grace, mercy and pardon. To grant mercy or pardon is to give
somebody less harsh treatment than would be expected given the
circumstances and the individual who can do so is one who has powerful
authority over the grantee. Furthermore, the authority-typically of the
monarch-to grant pardon or mercy is usually unlimited. Those in the
position to pardon can show grace to whomever they wish, just because
they so wish. In other words, pardons confirm the absolute power of the
monarch. This connection between the power of the state and mildness in
20051
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the form of pardon explains the astonishing fact that even the Nazis
engaged in a lively pardoning practice with the mildness involved in it. 3
The fascination of the Nazis with sovereignty could not fail to bring a
fascination with grace too. By contrast, America never accepted the idea
of a powerful, unlimited ruler, who could express unconditional
sovereignty by, inter alia, granting mercy and pardon. One can
understand, then, why the power to pardon has never had the kind of
public acceptability in America that it had, and still has, in Europe.
Being a strong state leads to milder punishment for a second reason,
Whitman points out. The power of a state is manifested in the autonomy
of its apparatuses, namely, the bureaucracies that steer it, which are to a
significant extent insulated from democratic pressures. The stronger and
the more independent the bureaucracy, the more restrained and sober its
system of punishment. And since "tepid, bureaucratic routinization sets
much of the critical tone in German and French punishment,"'4 the result is
the much weaker influence of popular feelings of anger and revenge, and,
consequently, a milder policy of punishment. The same point can be
made in a different way. The natural tendency of societies is to harbor
resentment and seek revenge towards those who don't play according to
the rules and who are responsible for offenses and harms. If the masses
have the say in how to take care of criminals through the democratic
politics of mass mobilization, the result is toughness in dealing with crime,
an attitude of the kind we witness nowadays in America. This result can
be prevented only if some countervailing tendency exists, such as a strong
and balanced bureaucracy, which is precisely the case in France and
Germany. "An intimate nexus" exists, then, "between the politics of mass
mobilization, unchecked by bureaucracy, and the making of harshness in
criminal punishment."'5
The legal and cultural history told by Whitman is fascinating and is
based on scholarship of the kind one rarely finds today. Nevertheless, I
am skeptical as to whether this history provides, as Whitman intends it to
do, a convincing explanation for the phenomenon under discussion, i.e.
the growing gap between Europe and the United States regarding the
theory and practice of punishment. Let me start with what seems the most
crucial omission in Whitman's thesis, namely an account of the more
recent history of America's attitude to punishment. Whitman explicitly
concedes that in spite of their different histories "the differences in
punishment practice between the US and Europe seemed to be vanishing
for a long time," and professionals everywhere in the West-including in
3. Id. at 148-49.
4. Id. at 200.
5. Id. at 15.
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the US-believed that individualized punishment "had permanently
displaced older ideas of retribution." 6 This reduction in the differences
between US and Europe occurred - needless to say -- in spite of their
different eighteenth century histories, not because of them, which means
that, by the late 1960s, the influence of these histories has faded away. But
then what happened "suddenly" 7 in the 70s that brought about such a
significant transformation in American punitive measures? It can't be the
different histories of social hierarchy, because the effects of these histories
had already been on the decline for some time. So even if the history told
in the book is accurate, it seems to fail to explain the current divide (of the
last twenty-five years) between the US and Europe. And if this
explanation does not do the work, the central question of the book remains
with no clear answer.
It would be rather presumptuous on my part to offer my own answer
here, but maybe less so if I point to possible routes indicated (though
underdeveloped) by Whitman himself. The first concerns the level of
violence in American society. Whitman acknowledges the well-known
fact that rates of violence are higher in the United States than in Europe,8
and the situation is especially bad (and certainly was so in the 70s) in the
big cities. Thus, the contemporary widening divide between America and
Europe might have to do not so much with their different social and
political histories, but with the different challenges they had to face in
terms of crime and violence. Maybe if France had to face the same level of
violence in its major cities as the United States did, it would have become
more open to American-style harsh measures. The current law-and-order
movement in France, mentioned by Whitman in a note at the beginning of
the book, might provide some support for this hypothesis. The second
possible explanation has to do with the feeling, confirmed by empirical
research in the 1970s, that rehabilitation simply was not working, 9 so that
the only way to stop crime was to "get tough." Why this research came to
fruition at that time is the kind of question which is always hard to answer,
but there is no need to do so for the sake of the present argument. What is
important is to realize the plausibility of a causal connection between this
perceived failure of rehabilitation in the 1970s and the trend towards
harsher punishment.
Let us turn back to the historical argument. How far can it take us,
anyhow? Not as far as the book assumes. In the last pages, Whitman
emphasizes that he is not assuming some universal law to the effect that
6. Id. at 193.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 204.
9. Id. at 193.
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all societies with sharply defined status hierarchies necessarily evolve into
countries with mild punishment practices, but only that traditions of state
authority always matter. But if so, then we still need an explanation as to
why the particular traditions of Europe and America developed in the way
they did. If other states exist with a tradition of relatively weak
-bureaucracies and with no monarchical legacy and, yet, they maintain a
mild punishment system, then a crucial element in the explanation for the
situation in America is missing. This element is what Whitman himself
refers to as the "something in the American idiom, something in American
culture, that is driving us toward harsh punishment."' 10 What is this
something that has been driving America towards retribution and
harshness? After all, things could have turned out differently. America
has seen moral progress during the last century in so many areas despite a
long history of oppression, discrimination, and prejudice. This progress
was made possible not only because of external forces and processes, but
also because there was something in American culture that made it open to
these progressive moves, something which has to do with ideas such as
respect for humanity, the centrality of rights and the value of freedom.
Why, then, did this progress leave the area of punishment more or less
untouched, while, at the same time, the continent was witnessing a
consistent move to milder punishment, individualization and respect?
It seems to me that the question cannot be fully answered without
reference to the depth of the retributive notion in American culture. The
retributive idea that the bad guys must pay for their evil acts, epitomized
powerfully in American Westerns, is so deeply rooted in American culture
that it might have pushed America to a harsher punishment policy than
Europe even if its history of social status had run more closely parallel to
that of Europe than it actually did. Thus, the divergence in their histories
of social status might have had some causal role to play, but it seems to
me a much smaller one than that assumed by Whitman. It definitely does
not form the explanation for the divide between Europe and the United
States regarding punishment, as Whitman claims."
Similarly, in spite of its originality, explaining the divide between
America and Europe in terms of the contrast between leveling-up and
leveling-down is unsatisfactory, because in the end we don't grasp why
America chose leveling down (or, more accurately, generalization of low-
status) while Europe chose leveling up. Whitman's explanation is that, in
Europe, low-status punishment would trigger collective memories of past
status degradation, memories that would discourage the endorsement of
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countervail the demand for retribution. 12 But this can't be the whole story.
As Whitman himself notes, 13 there is a good reason to expect that
American collective memory would also push towards milder and more
dignitary punishment, namely, the collective memory of slavery, in
particular of slave punishment: "One might expect, or hope, that the
memory of the slaveholding South would serve to push American legal
culture in the direction of a dignitary evolution like that of Europe."' 14
Whitman tries to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that while most
Europeans sympathize on some level with their low-status ancestors
because most of them can say, "we were all once at the bottom," most
Americans "do not identify with African slaves."' 15 This response does not
seem convincing, however. Whether or not they "identify" with African
slaves, most (white) Americans regard slavery as a dark chapter in their
history. The American collective memory of slavery contains shame, not
only about the very practices of enslavement, but also about the cruel
sanctions against slaves: flogging, hanging, etc. One would expect that
this would influence Americans to be more timid than Europeans in the re-
introduction of harsh and degrading punishments, not less timid, as they,
in fact, are.
Also, I doubt that the "collective memory" of past low-status
punishment which is assumed to discourage the adoption of undignified
and harsh punishment is uniquely searing in Europe, in comparison to
other Western countries, including the United States. After all, insofar as
such memory exists and operates in France and Germany today, it is not a
direct one, but a result of reading books (and maybe watching some
movies) about old-time, cruel punishment. But these works, literary and
historical, are read in the United States too, so it is unclear why Americans
did not develop the same kind of collective repulsion to harsh punishment
that, on Whitman's view, evolved in Europe. In other words, it is unclear
why the European memory of the low-status, harsh practices is so much
more traumatic than the American memory so as to lead to such a divide
between them in the punishments that are imposed.
The historical story told by Whitman in Harsh Justice is a fine
achievement of a scholar deeply immersed in numerous fields: law,
history, culture, philosophy. I have tried to show that the historical
argument has its limitations and falls short of explaining the punitive
policies and practices of the last twenty five years. We might be closer to
providing an explanation for the divide as it exists today if Whitman's
12. Id. at 196.
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thesis were augmented by further examination of the deep sense of
retributivism in American culture, the high rates of violence in the US,
and the publication of studies in the 1970s about the ineffectiveness of
rehabilitation. And maybe-who knows- such an explanation could
mark the beginning of a change towards a more humane and
compassionate society.
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